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Abstract
This paper describes a series of simulations run to estimate various worm growth patterns
and their corresponding propagation algorithms. It also tests and veries the impact of vari-
ous improvements, starting from a trivial simulation of worm propagation and the underlying
network infrastructure to more rened models, it attempts to determine the theoretical max-
imum propagation speed of worms and how it can be achieved. It also estimates the impact
a malicious worm could have on the overall infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
Much has been written about worms since Code Red, though they are hardly a new phenomenon.
Most of what has been written has been exaggerated and contains little technical details. The
technical articles fall in two categories: Coding new or analysing old worms, i.e. implementation
details on the one hand. Mathematical modelling, usually through population/epidemic models
on the other.
To the best of my knowledge, no in-depth study using actual or simulated worm behaviour has
been published so far. This paper closes this gap, though much more work in this area can be
done.1
1.1 Motivation
The main purpose of this article is to show that we will need new and better countermeasures
against worms. I will demonstrate that propagation algorithms capable of "Flash Worm" speeds
are feasible. As such, there is no margin for the current cycle of defending against worms, where we,
the security community, wait until we catch a copy, then analyse it, then discuss countermeasures
to be deployed manually. In the near future, the game will be over before discussion can even
begin, and the worm will have infected the entire Internet before we know what we are dealing
with.
1.2 Methodology
All data in this article was derived from simulation. Using simulation instead of mathematical
formula allowed me to approximate closer to actual worm propagation, introduce random factors
and model adaptive behaviour.
A simple simulation program was written that holds a simplied dataset of a "scaled down"
Internet (one class A network, 16 mio. addresses). Using a network (with shortened, but otherwise
proper IP addresses, e.g. "127.0.1") allowed me to re-create local preferences such as demonstrated
by Nimda. Information about each host is highly abstracted and most real-world issues such as
server load, monitoring systems and other artifacts which will intentionally or unintentionally
hinder a worms propagation, were ignored. A simple 1% chance for any connection to fail was
included as a primitive simulation of general network unreliability.
In the real world, IP address space is not distributed randomly. Large chunks are unused
while others are nearly lled. Where you nd one server of a specic kind, others are often in the
vicinity.
In the simulated network, simple clusters have been added based on class C size net-blocks. For
every net-block, a "preference value" is randomly assigned, using the same model of distribution
as described above for individual hosts. If the preference indicates a largely unused address space,
there is a 50% chance for each individual address to be automatically unused as well. Otherwise,
the normal (random) distribution of hosts applies. If the preference indicates a certain host type,
there is a 25% chance that the server will be of this type, otherwise the normal distribution applies.
Note that the normal distribution can give the same result that the preference would have given.
Hosts (used IP addresses) appear as abstractions in the simulation. Instead of modelling various
operating systems and services, each host is simply considered to be one of the following:
oine which denotes unused address space or systems not currently connected, as well as "Dark
Address Space"[1]. Also, servers behind a rewall that drops (instead of rejecting) connection
attempts to the vulnerable port fall for all practical purposes into this category. Connections
to these systems will time out, which can take a while. 70% of the address space is unused
or oine.
1A simulation model for a Code Red II like worm is included in the simulation software SSFNet, release 1.5 - I
am not aware of any research on modifying this model with the intend of creating a better worm.1 INTRODUCTION 4
other service contains systems not oering the service in question, e.g. mail-servers (SMTP)
for a worm spreading via a web (HTTP) vulnerability. These systems reply with an RST
packet to the connection attempt, allowing the worm to continue quickly to other systems.
50% of the existing hosts (15% of the address space) are assumed to be of this category.
not vulnerable includes systems running the service in question who are not vulnerable to the
virus propagation method, usually an exploit of a specic server software. For example,
Apache web-servers were not vulnerable to Code Red. About 47% of the hosts are assumed
to belong to this group.
vulnerable these are all systems that the worm can infect, but has not yet infected. Only 1%
of the address space (about 3% of the hosts) are considered vulnerable. In light of past
virus outbreaks, this number appeared as realistic, if not conservative. Modications of the
fraction of vulnerable hosts will be investigated in section 4.3.2.
infected systems successfully infected by the worm, and now acting as propagation points. Ini-
tially, no systems are infected, until at the start of the simulation a given number of systems
is chosen as starting points for the worm.
Table 1 shows examples from the simulated network and the distribution of hosts over it. The
rst network contains a typical large hosting site using a non-vulnerable server software, with a
few future victims in between, possibly as test servers. The second network could be another
mass-hoster, but one using the vulnerable software, with a couple of immune systems (patched
or broken in a way that disables the worm, or using a non-vulnerable version) and some systems
with other services. The third is a sparse network with 15% of the addresses used, mostly for a
dierent service. These might be mostly routers or monitoring systems.
Network Total Hosts Other Services Not Vulnerable Vulnerable
69.1.0/24 160 56 101 3
82.220.0/24 166 40 33 93
103.127.0/24 39 28 9 2
Table 1: Examples for system distribution
Interpretation of these values should not go too far, as it is but a very simple simulation of the
clustering eect visible in real networks. It will be interesting later on, though, to analyse whether
vulnerable systems in the midst of other vulnerable systems, or as the odd one out in a largely
non-vulnerable network have better chances of survival.
1.3 Real-World Comparisons
Code Red, still the most famous of the recent Internet worms, spread to over 350,000 systems in
about 13 hours, with the fastest and most visible part of the growth process (from under 10,000
to over 300,000 systems) happening in about 4 hours according to CAIDA[2] or 9 hours if you
choose to believe CERT[3].
Code Red II improved on the propagation algorithm with a resulting increase in propagation
speed. According to some news media, it spread "4000 times faster"[4] than the original Code
Red. This number is very likely inated, possibly even arbitrary. Actual analysis is made more
dicult due to the continued spread of the rst Code Red during CR2s appearance, but hints at
a propagation speed only slightly faster than Code Red. However, CR2 spread in a more dicult
environment with system administrators being aware of the problem and many systems having
been patched.
Sapphire/Slammer improved on the Code Red variants and the later Nimda considerably:1 INTRODUCTION 5
The Sapphire Worm was the fastest computer worm in history. As it began spreading
throughout the Internet, it doubled in size every 8.5 seconds. It infected more than 90
percent of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes.[10]
This is certainly a performance that a theoretical worm should aspire to reach, or beat.
1.4 Other Reading Material
 "How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time"[6] is a formal analysis of Code Red, Code
Red II and Nimda, and contains some theory on future worms as well. It is heavier on the
math than this paper, but limits itself to a simple simulation. It contains many intelligent
insights into worm design and propagation algorithms. It also creates the terms "Warhol
worm"and "Flash worm".
 "The Future of Internet Worms"[7] is a broader approach on the subject, including payload
proposals and looks at key components of worm capabilities. It gives especially valuable
insights into the possible damage a professionally written worm could cause.
 Bruce Ediger's NWS http://www.users.qwest.net/~eballen1/nws/ is a network worm
simulator written in Perl. It uses a much smaller network (Class B size) but shows very
similar results. The website is also much heavier on mathematics and concentrates more
heavily on analysis than on possible improvements.
Many other articles have been written about worms in the wake of Code Red and later media
events. One good collection is provided by Sans[8].
1.5 Limitations
The simulations does not take into account latency issues, hop-count or connectivity issues. It
does make some attempts to consider bandwidth limitations and transfer times in the more rened
models.
Since the simulated network is just 1
256th the size of the Internet, all results must be assumed
on that scale, taking into account the growth curve of the worm. For exponential growth, which
most propagation algorithms at least approach, that means all times given need to be multiplied
by about 2.4, i.e. a worm spreading through the entire simulation network in 2 hours would require
just under 5 hours for the real Internet. This scale factor should be taken with care, however, as
it does not take real-world complications into account at all, and no conclusive proof as to how
exactly networks of this size scale up has been presented so far.2 THEORETICAL LIMITS 6
2 Theoretical limits
After nding some of the propagation speeds shown below, I also wanted to establish the "speed
of light", i.e. the highest possible propagation speed that a perfect worm could reach.
With enough abstraction, this is trivial. Assume that the worm has perfect knowledge and
wastes no time whatsoever on scanning unused address space or attacking non-vulnerable systems.
Then the only limiting factor to propagation speed is the number of systems the worm can infect
in a given time t. Call this propagation rate r. Then the number of systems infected can be
expressed as the following series, starting with i systems initially infected:[9]
n0 = i
n1 = n0 + rn0 = (r + 1)n0
n2 = n1 + rn1 = (r + 1)n1 = (r + 1)(r + 1)n0 = (r + 1)2n0
[...]
nt = nt 1 + rnt 1 = (r + 1)tn0 = (r + 1)ti
In the special case of i = 1(i.e. starting the infection from a single system), solving for t gives
the time required to infect a given population:
t = log(r+1)nt
Please note that r is the number of successful infections per second. Neither re-infections, nor
attempts on non-vulnerable systems are taken into account in this formula.
2.1 Conclusion of theoretical analysis
Looking at some numbers, the perfect worm puts the concept of a Flash worm (10 minutes or
less) to shame. At an infection rate of 1 (each system infects one other system per second), a
population of one million will be completely infected in under 20 seconds.
Rate Pop. 100 Pop. 1,000 Pop. 10,000 Pop. 100,000 Pop. 1 mio Pop. 10 mio
0.2 25.26 37.89 50.52 63.15 75.78 88.40
0.5 11.36 17.04 22.72 28.39 34.07 39.76
1 6.64 9.97 13.29 16.61 19.93 23.25
2 4.19 6.29 8.38 10.48 12.58 14.67
5 2.57 3.86 5.14 6.43 7.71 9.00
10 1.92 2.88 3.84 4.80 5.76 6.72
20 1.51 2.27 3.03 3.78 4.54 5.29
Table 2: Theoretical propagation speeds of a perfect worm
As shown in Table 2, with ten infections per second, a target population of one million would
be completely infected in under 6 seconds. Higher infection rates will reduce this further, but
for all practical purposes, the dierence between 6 seconds and 3 seconds (at 100 infections per
second) is negligible, and the return on investment decreases sharply beyond about 10.
While the assumed total knowledge seems entirely theoretical, the Flash Worm concept dis-
cussed in [6] is describing one approach to realize this perfection, through pre-scanning of the
entire network. Section 4.5 on page 17 will discuss this option.3 INITIAL TESTS 7
3 Initial Tests
Some preliminary testing was done on a simplied dataset with a random distribution of hosts.
It already shows the typical worm propagation graph from slow start to explosive growth until
saturation2 is reached. It is also interesting to see that the infection rate tops almost precisely
when a 50% saturation is reached. The other graphs will support this conclusion, and it seems
apparent to the author that it can be mathematically proven. This carries consequences to the
development of detection and alarm systems, as does the fact that once the growth is visible on
the chart, the explosive growth phase has almost begun already.
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Figure 1: Initial, random dataset with random propagation algorithm
This dataset is based on the following data:
 The distribution method discussed resulted in just over 160,000 vulnerable systems in a
network of about 5 million active hosts. At at about 3%, they certainly are a small minority.
 Timeouts for unreachable (oine/unused) systems is 30 seconds, 1 second is used up for
probes to non-web-server systems and 2 seconds are needed to infect a vulnerable system.
This includes all overhead. The worm uses one thread, no parallel processing.
 A snapshot was taken and converted to a data point for the graph every 10 minutes.
 5 systems were initially infected at time 0.
The interesting part of the worms growth, that which I call the "explosive growth phase", takes
about 4 hours in this graph, just like Code Red did. However, the simulated network is a reduced-
size network, and applying the scale factor mentioned in section 1.5 on page 5 results in a time
frame of 9 to 10 hours even under ideal circumstances.
2Saturation shall be dened as over 90% of the infect-able systems actually having been infected.3 INITIAL TESTS 8
3.1 Variations in initial infected systems
Changing the number of initially infected systems shifts the curve, as expected. Various discussions
on advanced worm design mentioned pre-infecting a large number of systems as an important step
to speeding up worm propagation. However, the data clearly shows that unless a signicant part
of the vulnerable systems is pre-infected, there is not much dierence to the actual propagation.
Since pre-infecting considerable amounts of systems carries a high risk of discovery, it appears to
not be a winning strategy.
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Figure 2: Random dataset and propagation with various numbers of pre-infected systems
While the 500-preinfected-systems graph starts visibly much earlier than the 50 and the default
(5 systems) graphs, there is very little dierence in the explosive growth phase, and the total time
gained is just over 3 hours3. Infecting 500 systems manually, and adding a trigger or other
mechanism to have them start the worm simultaneously, will take much longer than just starting
with a few systems and waiting the same time that would have been spent on coding, not to
mention that the resulting worm will be smaller and simpler, thus less prone to have bugs.
We can conclude that, at least with random propagation, any eort invested in pre-infecting
systems is a waste of time. A worm will spread just as well and almost as quickly from a single or
few systems. In practical terms, the chances of detection are fairly small during the "slow start"
period, because of the small number of systems infected and the side-eects of propagation being
too low to trigger any alarms.
3.2 Reducing timeouts
Since it was assumed that 70% of the address space is either unused or oine (or rewalled with
a drop rule, which will result in the same behaviour as an oine system), connection attempts
to these systems will go unanswered and the socket will wait for a timeout before another system
can be scanned, at least if the worm is using TCP connections4. These timeouts are the longest
3The curves do not match near the end because each simulation run randomly generates the network anew,
which results in small dierences in the total number of infectable systems.
4Sapphire/Slammer used UDP, the main reason for its speed3 INITIAL TESTS 9
time factor, since a timeout takes much longer than transmitting even a comparably large worm
code over even a slow connection. It appears obvious that reducing the timeout would result in a
considerable increase in speed for the worm.
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Figure 3: Random dataset and propagation with reduced timeouts
Reducing the timeout from 30 to 15 seconds (while still using 5 pre-infected systems as in the
very rst study) results in an accelerated propagation as shown in Figure 3. Not only does the
noticeable growth part of the graph start much earlier, it is also steeper, or as can be seen from
the new victims line, the number of systems infected per cycle is considerably higher. This way,
the explosive growth cycle lasts less than two hours. Even ignoring time-zones, this would likely
overwhelm the reactive capabilities of the administrator- and anti-virus community.
Various technologies exist to reduce the timeouts considerably. The worm could bring its own
low-level TCP/IP processing, or it could simply change the operating systems settings.
A large number of arguments can be made in favour of reducing timeouts considerably, even
below the 15 second value used for the simulation above. Systems slow in answering are either a
large number of hops away, on a very high latency pipe, or overloaded. The last two do not make
good virus propagators anyway, while the rst can be ignored as it will very likely be infected by
a system closer by later on.
3.3 Parallelised probes aka multi-threading
Probing the address space is intuitively as well as shown by the previous graphs the most time-
consuming part of the propagation. Optimisations of probing will therefore go a long way to
speeding up worm propagation.
Scanning only one potential victim, possibly waiting for a lengthy timeout is sub-optimal given
that all worm host platforms are easily capable of opening many connections at once. In fact, all
recent worms have been making use of parallel threads.
Figure 4 shows the propagation graph using the default parameters, except that each
client/victim runs 10 threads in parallel. The threads are not optimised to avoid collisions and
may rescan addresses already scanned or infected by dierent threads. However, due to the size3 INITIAL TESTS 10
of the address space in comparison to the amount of scanning done by a single client (at most 60
addresses per minute and thread, or 6000 addresses per snapshot, out of 16 million) this should
not have a noticeable impact on the results.
Please note that this graph has a resolution of 2 minutes and shows only 90 minutes total,
instead of 12 hours with a 10 minute resolution. On the 12-hour/10-minutes scale used until now,
there would have been very little to see except an almost vertical line.
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Figure 4: Random dataset and propagation with multi-threading
The result is obvious, with saturation reached in one hour, and the explosive growth phase
taking but 30 minutes. This would translate to less than two hours on an Internet-sized network
according to the scaling factor discussed on page 5 - faster than the actual speed of all but the
Slammer worm, even though it uses only 10 parallel threads. This does not answer the question
of why the real-life examples we know of were so inecient, even though they were using parallel
processing at much higher levels (100 threads in Code Red, up to 300 for Code Red II[11]).
Section 4 on page 12 will discuss further why this is so and how a more realistic simulation will
be realized.
Even though existing worms already employ considerable multi-threading, recent research[12]
allows parallelism levels unheard of before. Scanrand claims to be able to map a class B network
within seconds[13], with minimal resource waste. Parallel operations allow the worm to continue
spreading even while waiting for replies or timeouts. In fact, both can be very easily combined
into a single concept, which aims to minimise the worms idle periods.
3.4 Combining threading and reduced timeouts
The two most eective algorithm changes identied so far, reduced timeouts and multi-threading,
can easily be combined. The result is shown in Figure 5.
The worm using both multi-threading and reduced timeout reaches saturation in just over
30 minutes in this simplied simulation. At the peak of its propagation, it infects over 30,000
systems per minute. The amount of scanning alone would probably bring down entire networks if
it happened in the real world.3 INITIAL TESTS 11
 0
 20000
 40000
 60000
 80000
 100000
 120000
 140000
 160000
 180000
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
H
o
s
t
s
Time (minutes)
New Victims
Total Victims
Figure 5: Multi-threading, parallel worm with random propagation
While this gure shows a considerable improvement in propagation speed already, it does
nothing to use the synergy possible with changes in the basic approach. The worm is still using
the most basic algorithm to spread, namely targeting random systems and sending a copy of itself
in their direction.
Also, this simple simulation did not yet take into account issues such as bandwidth limitations,
which are likely to dramatically reduce the worm propagation speed. However each system in this
simulation is sending out a mere 10 probes per second, which is unlikely to be a major factor even
for slow connections. Not the individual connections, but the bandwidth available at uplinks and
on the backbone will be the bottleneck.
Other system resources are likewise not likely to be limiting factors. Using 15 seconds timeout,
each infected system will at most have 150 connections open at any time, plus whatever it regularly
has. Actual propagation of the worm will be a more important factor. At the assumed 2-second
transfer time, the worm will require a bandwidth of up to 5 times its own size per second (i.e. a
200 KB worm needs up to 100 KB/s). This value will seldom be reached, however, as most of the
time of an individual system is spent with scanning, not sending out copies.4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 12
4 Improved propagation algorithms
All of the simulations so far have used a random propagation algorithm, where the worm selects
its next target at random. The perfect worm described on page 6 as well as the theoretical Warhol
worm of [6] assume a more intelligent approach, however. Several of these can be simulated.
It should be obvious that an improved propagation algorithm will speed up the worm. However,
the exact extend of various changes has not been the focus of any research so far.
4.1 Local preference
Code Red II as well as later worms have shown a simple improvement of the random propagation
algorithm, based on the fact of clustering. This was described as part of the simulated network on
page 3. The idea is that real world computing centers are often mono-cultures, or at least show a
strong preference for one type of system. Given the administrative cost associated with running a
variety of systems instead of one type, this does make sense from a business point of view, and it
also allows a worm to propagate more easily by looking into its neighbourhood rst.
Running the simulation with an algorithm that shows a preference modelled closely after the
Code Red II behaviour results in the graph shown in gure 6.
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Figure 6: Local preference propagation
This simulation was run with the same values as the initial test (gure 1 on page 7), except for
the propagation algorithm. Note that the worm with a local preference algorithm begins his assault
much sooner, after about 200 minutes instead of the 300 minutes that the randomly spreading
worm requires to get going. It also propagates slightly faster during the explosive growth phase,
especially prior to the peak.
Also of interest is the fact that the graph shows a steep left, and propagates only slowly to the
last few percent of the victim population. The algorithm thus gains the worm an initial increase
in propagation speed, at the price of a slowdown later.
In another simulation the most ecient improvements from the preliminary tests were com-4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 13
bined with the local preference algorithm. Using the same values as for gure 5, except for the
propagation algorithm, results in the graph shown in gure 7.
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Figure 7: Local preference with multi-threading and short timeouts
The result is in part as expected, namely with an earlier start of the explosive growth phase at
about 15 min instead of 22 in gure 5. However, the worm is only slightly more eective, reaching
saturation only minutes earlier than its competitor.
From a visual analysis of the graph it appears as if the local preference algorithm has been
dominated by the timeout and threading changes, though it still does succeed in shifting the graph
considerably to the left. Further analysis was not done on this phenomenon.
4.1.1 Considerations on local preferences
In a real-world situation it is likely that a local preference algorithm will show a stronger im-
provement as compared to a broader approach, as networks in the same net-block are often geo-
graphically and network-topologically close, resulting in faster and more reliable communication,
which in turn will speed up both the probing and the infection itself, especially once load on the
backbone due to worm activity is reaching critical levels.
4.2 Sequential Scanning
Used by the Blaster worm of August 2003, this algorithm lets each newly infected system choose
a random Class C network to start from (40% chance of selecting its current one), then scans
sequentially from there. Initial assumptions conclude that this algorithm should be worse than
random scanning, as they will create a lot of redundancies. However, like local preference, this
algorithm has the advantage once it found a network densely populated with vulnerable systems.
Here is the initial graph, all values at their defaults, except for the resolution which has been
halved because otherwise the worm would be barely visible:
As can be seen, the simulation conrms the assumption that this algorithm is considerably
worse than a simple random target selection would have been. Simulation runs without the local4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 14
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Figure 8: Sequential-scanning worm
preference part also suggest that this addition actually hurts the propagation speed, and is the
main factor for the slowdown.
Repeated simulations runs have shown, however, that this algorithm is very susceptible to
chance. If it manages to hit one or more networks with many vulnerable hosts early on, it spreads
considerably faster than during other simulation runs where it has no such luck. In fact, one very
lucky run was almost as fast as the random target selection algorithm. The graph above was
chosen as an average example, erring on the side of caution.
The actual data from Blaster's propagation conrm these results.
4.2.1 Improved Target Selection
All the simulations so far assumed that the worm res itself completely at both vulnerable and
non-vulnerable systems. Blaster did not do that. If it failed to infect a system, the TFTP transfer
would not happen. Thus, infecting a vulnerable system would take less time then trying to infect
a non-vulnerable system. A series of simulation runs were conducted with a parameter choice that
was selected in order to approximate Blaster. It is slower on infecting vulnerable systems (3 sec.
instead of 2 sec.) but faster when it hits a non-vulnerable system (1 sec. instead of 2 sec.).
The graph of this experiment is not included as it is almost identical to the previous graph.
There is a barely noticeable improvement in propagation speed, but it pales in comparison to other
changes, and it does not compensate the decrease the sequential-scanning algorithm introduces.
4.3 Better Vulnerabilities
It has been mentioned[14] that some actual worms were hindered by their own bugs or choice of
vulnerability to exploit. Even though the infection vector is often not a matter of choice for the
worm author, it should not be left out of this treatment.4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 15
4.3.1 Higher infection speed
The main strength of the Sapphire/Slammer worm was its infection vector, using a single UDP
packet. In addition to not having to go through a TCP handshake and not having to keep a state,
sessions and sockets allocated, this also allowed for a faster infection of vulnerable targets than
the several KB-sized worms of the Code Red variant could manage, especially with hosts already
under heavy load or with bad network connections.
It was not to be expected that this would have a severe impact on propagation speed, in light
of the fact that timeouts have already been shown to be the major factor5. In fact, a simulation
run with infection time requirements halved resulted in only a marginal increase in speed, with the
peak shifting forward about 20 minutes, from 440 to 420. Infection speeds were thus not evaluated
in detail.
4.3.2 Larger vulnerable population
Obviously, using a better exploit as the infection vector would lead to a larger infectable population
rst. Ideally, a worm would attempt to be able to infect as large a part of the host population as
possible.
In a simulation, shifting the distribution of hosts accomplishes this eect, by declaring non-
vulnerable hosts or such with a dierent service (to take into account worms with multiple infection
vectors) as vulnerable. Figure 9 shows the resulting graph from the simulation with four times as
many vulnerable hosts as the model used elsewhere in this paper, twice the resolution (one tick
being 300 seconds) and otherwise the same parameters as in gure 1 on page 7.
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Figure 9: Worm with a higher vulnerable population
Unsurprisingly, a larger vulnerable population leads to a considerably faster propagation, as
more hosts are found more easily. This fact is well known in medicine when it comes to epidemics
and is why vaccination is often government-enforced.
5This also explains Sapphire/Blasters speed: As a UDP worm, it could work on a "re and forget" principle,
eliminating timeouts completely.4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 16
It can, however, also be seen that a better vulnerability alone does not make a Flash worm.
Quadruplicating the vulnerable population does not speed up the propagation of the worm by an
equal factor, but only by a factor of about 2.5.
4.4 Subdividing
Much has been written about subdividing search space, where each worm spawns children of itself
that search only a part of the address space. Using this method, the worm as a whole searches
the address space much like a binary tree search, which is known to be more ecient then a linear
search.
A rst implementation was made that subdivides locally, i.e. each child will inherit the net-
mask from its parent +1, centered on itself. The initial worms will scan the entire network, the
2nd generation only half, the 3rd only a quarter, etc. When the net-mask reaches /20, it is reset
to /0.
This algorithm surprisingly oers no speedup, and is comparable to a pure random propaga-
tion. It does exhibit a strong dependency on random factors and a less well-dened growth curve
compared to other algorithms.
The graph in gure 10 was created by a modied algorithm that increases the mask by 4 points
per tick instead of just one.
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Figure 10: Subdividing the target space
This does result in a left-steep curve and a considerably faster propagation, much like local
preference does. In fact, subdividing can be seen as a special case of local preference, where the
preference stays constant, but is dierent for each instance of the worm, depending on generation
count.
4 seems to be near the optimum number here, as experiments with both lower and higher
increases did not improve the propagation speed any further.4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 17
4.5 Pre-scanning
With the advance of stateless scanning algorithms as utilised by scanrand and mentioned above
on page 10, it has become possible for a worm to avoid TCP timeouts entirely, taking away one of
the largest slowdown factors.6. The following simulation is using a theoretical worm that uses a
stateless scanning algorithm and proceeds to infection attempts only when it receives a reply. It
thus has no timeout whatsoever and is limited only by the number of probes it can send out and
the number of replies it can handle.
The algorithm used in the simulation works as follows: The worm picks a /26 network (64
addresses) instead of a single target. It probes this network, which is assumed to take 10 seconds, a
value taken from short experiments with scanrand and believed by the author to be good enough to
reach a reliability as follows or better: Systems running the service in question (immune, infectable
or infected) have a 95% chance to be detected. Systems up, but running a dierent service have
a 1% chance to show up as false positives (wasting one second for the worm). Unused or oine
systems will never show up.7
Next, all the detected systems are infected, at the same speed as before (2 seconds per system).
Again, the rst simulation of this new algorithm uses no multi-threading. Nevertheless, it is so
ecient, that the graph resolution has been increased to 30 minutes at 30 seconds per tick.
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Figure 11: Pre-scanning /26 networks
The main conceptual dierence of this worm is that entire networks are attacked instead of
individual hosts. In the simulation, /26 network were targeted, and the worm reached saturation
in under 20 minutes. No experiments with larger net-blocks were conducted.
Scanning, especially if it can be done ecient, has thus been shown able to improve a worm's
propagation speed considerably, by eliminating the timeout delays which have been shown as a
major factor already. One other factor is not shown in graphs so far, but deserves mentioning:
6If 70% of the address space is unused, and a timeout is 30 sec. compared to at most 2 sec. for an infection or
failure, attempting to connect to non-existing hosts takes about 97% of the time.
7A simulation accounting for LaBrea or other tar pits would have been interesting, but outside the scope of this
experiment.4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 18
The number of probes sent out in total and the amount of bandwidth consumed. Section 7 will
review this data.
4.5.1 Revisiting initial infections
Even though section 3.1 showed that pre-infecting a number of systems has but a minor eect on
the worm propagation speed, the existence of eective scanning algorithms oers new approaches.
Instead of manually infecting dozens or hundreds of hosts, the worm could spread from a few
hosts, but target networks with many known-vulnerable hosts initially.
The simulation of gure 12 employs such an initial round of pre-infection. For each initially
infected system (10 were used), one round of attacking a randomly chosen network with at least
50 vulnerable hosts was initiated at time 0. This starts the worm out with at least 500, more
likely 1000 or more infected systems. As seen in section 3.1, the eect of increasing the initially
infected systems consists of accelerating the initial phase of the worm, where it otherwise shows
no visible activity.
As the graph shows, the simulation is nally approaching the speed predicted in the Flash
worm concept, reaching saturation in about 10 minutes.
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Figure 12: Pre-scanning with pre-infection
4.6 Adaptive behaviour
There are many theoretical forms of adaptive behaviour, but in this article only methods to
improve propagation speed are of interest. Of that subset, only those that the worm can conduct
autonomously are worth examining, as the purpose is still to develop an algorithm that is too
quick for human interaction.
4.6.1 Avoiding re-infections
So far, the worm has not changed its behaviour depending on what it nds. Ideally, though,
it would skip already infected systems. If the propagation algorithm aims at entire networks, it4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 19
should even skip net-blocks. This does, of course, open up the way for an easy antidote. Depending
on what the purpose of the worm is, and whether or not it can be completed before an antidote
is likely to arrive, this does not have to be cause for much concern, though.
The following worm will use pre-scanning as in section 4.5, except that it is assumed that
infected systems can modify their hosts in such a way that the scan will identify them. When a
worm nds an already infected system in the net-block it scans, it will skip the net-block and scan
another random target with a 90% chance. A 10% chance to attack the already infected block
anyways was left in order to get systems infected that slipped through the earlier attack.
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Figure 13: Adaptive behaviour of a scanning worm
This added intelligence makes the propagation curve steeper, resulting in a speed gain of about
10%.
4.7 Do-not-enter Zones
It could be demonstrated that a worm with more information is faster. One piece of information
is readily available and would almost certainly help the worm speed up considerably, as it has also
been demonstrated that oine systems are a major time sink: If the worm could carry a list of
unassigned or unused networks, i.e. know where there simply are no targets to be had, it could
stop wasting time there and concentrate on the populated parts of the network instead. Of course,
this means more data for the worm to carry, which makes it larger. However, a reasonably short
list of large net-blocks (class A or B) would do and would not be very large.
Due to the simplicity of the cluster algorithm used in the simulation, a simplication of this
process had to be used, as there are no entirely unused net-blocks in the simulated network. For
the following graph, it was assumed that the worm knows about all networks that have zero
vulnerable hosts and less than 30 hosts total. This happen to be about 1.5% of the address space,
or the equivalent of 4 class B networks, certainly an amount of information that even a small worm
can easily carry.
Even though a speedup was to be expected, the actual improvement is quite surprising given
that the worm possesses only a few bytes of information. More information can be expected to4 IMPROVED PROPAGATION ALGORITHMS 20
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Figure 14: Pre-scanning worm with do-not-enter zones
result in even more improvements, but it stands to reason that the large unused net-blocks are
included in this gure and adding more data would increase the worm disproportionately. In
addition, a short simulation with twice as many do-not-enter networks showed only a marginal
performance increase.5 ADVANCED WORMS 21
5 Advanced Worms
The following worms are based on the results from the experiments above, but were simulated on
an improved version of the simulation software. This allowed for greater precision and a maximum
resolution of one millisecond instead of one full second.
There were also technical reasons that required a partly rewritten software, as the simpler
version would have required excessive amounts of memory.
5.1 The Advanced Worm
Combining the most eective methods found so far, a good worm should:
 Use a fast, stateless scanning mechanism to nd its targets
 Start with known-vulnerable net-blocks
 Avoid known-empty and already infected net-blocks
 Run multiple parallel threads
 Be small and infect quickly
The worm should, of course, also avoid those methods shown to be ineective, and it should not
depend on unknown variables or pure chance. Some of the algorithms visited above have a small
chance of being much more eective then the averaged graphs demonstrate, but they also tend to
be much slower when they are out of luck.
It is easy to simulate a worm following the above conditions, and still reaching a frightening
average propagation speed. The rst simulation result, which uses no multi-threading, is shown
in gure 15.
This worm starts with 10 initially infected hosts, adds a single round of spreading into known-
vulnerable networks, then propagates using the pre-scanning algorithm with both do-not-enter
zones and skipping net-blocks if it nds that they are already infected. It takes 500 milliseconds
to infect a host, and 200 to detect (and ignore) a non-vulnerable one.
Please note that the timescale is in seconds, not minutes.
A local preference part was tested, as it was assumed that it would speed up the early propaga-
tion phase, but simulation runs revealed that while it did that, it also slowed the entire propagation
down, in result delaying saturation by about 2 minutes.
The slow start of this worm - the curve is slightly steep at the right - could not yet be suciently
explained, except by the theory that its initial start is articially inated due to the pre-infection
round.
Even taking the scaling factor into account and erring amply on the side of caution, a worm
like this should be able to infect the current Internet in less then half an hour and would take
less than 10 minutes to go from rst attention to critical mass. It is very unlikely that the
security community could stop or even delay it. Aside from some exceptionally paranoid network
administrators who pull the plug at the rst sign of trouble, the worm would be able to deliver its
payload with near-certainty.
A few simulation runs were conducted with more initially infected systems, to eliminate the
early slow start, but there are only a few percentage points of speedup in two, ve or even three
times the numbers.
Network load and hard to simulate real life complications will have a larger impact on propa-
gation speed at this point then further renements of the algorithm.5 ADVANCED WORMS 22
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Figure 15: Advanced Worm
5.1.1 Multi-Threading the Advanced Worm
The worm in gure 15 has one shortcoming that has already been found to be a slowdown factor:
It is single-threaded. The speed gain from the initial worm (gure 1 on page 7) to the multi-
threading worm (gure 4 on page 10) was more than a factor of ve, for ten threads. If a similar
gain can be made with a more advanced worm, the result should be able to beat the Flash Worms.
Indeed, it does, as gure 16 shows, where it reaches saturation in just over one minute. Even
with careful extrapolation, it would do the same on an Internet-sized network in less than ve
minutes.
The performance improvement is smaller than for the initial worm, only about factor 3. The
return-on-investment is diminishing even stronger for additional threads. A simulation with 50
threads brought a gain of roughly factor 1.5, moving the saturation point to just under 60 seconds.
No further experiments with multiple threads were conducted.
Comparing this worm to the "speed of light" from page 6 shows that the advanced multi-
threading worm is coming close. At its peak it infects 34,000 hosts during a 5-second interval,
from 17,500 then infected hosts. This computes to a rate r of of about 0.389. Returning to the
formula this solves to:
t = log(r+1)nt = log1:389162000 = 36:506
Giving 36.5 seconds as the time until complete infection of a perfect worm with the same
infection rate.6 IMPROVING THE SIMULATION 23
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Figure 16: Advanced Multi-Threading Worm
6 Improving the simulation
6.1 Network structure
In the simulation, the network was considered to be at, i.e. each node can reach every other node
directly. No routers or other parts of the network structure were simulated, except by viewing
them as non-vulnerable hosts. No backbone was assumed, and no connection problems, latency
issues and especially not overload situations were considered.
All of these do aect worm propagation in reality, usually to its detriment.
However, a simulation of these conditions is far from trivial, especially if it must be automati-
cally generated as the manual creation of a class A network structure8 is far beyond the scope of
this research.
6.2 Considering limited bandwidth
Likewise, all network connections are assumed to posses unlimited bandwidth, and no congestion
or failure due to heavy load was simulated. Again, it would have been complicated and time
consuming to do so, and no guarantees could have been made that the results were not dependent
on the specic conditions that were generated.
The simulation did count the number of probes sent out and an estimate on the total bandwidth
used, and these will be described in section 7 on page 25. They had no inuence on the propagation
of the worm itself, however.
6.3 Reactions and host-based eects
No eort was made to consider patching or other countermeasures by vulnerable or victim hosts.
Since the goal of this research was to create a worm that would spread too fast for non-automated
8Or better yet: Several to ensure that the results are not tainted by a specic network topology6 IMPROVING THE SIMULATION 24
countermeasures, these were left out even from the initial slow algorithms in order to allow com-
parison without compensation for these dierences.
6.4 Finer resolution
The simulation was greatly hampered by its choice of a 1-second minimum resolution. Very few
worms actually require a full second to infect a host, for example, much less two. Even though the
speedup of this particular change can be expected to be only about 5% (as seen in section 4.3.1 on
page 15), a ner resolution in all aspects, including not only infection, but also probing and
identifying non-vulnerable hosts, can be expected to increase the propagation speed.
In fact, the Sapphire/Slammer worms high speed and propagation could not be simulated
without a much ner resolution, as was used in the advanced simulations.7 ESTIMATING THE IMPACT ON THE NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE 25
7 Estimating the impact on the network infrastructure
Even ignoring any malicious payloads (which will be discussed in section 8), a worm of size will
have a considerable impact on the network infrastructure, through the volume of scans and/or
infection attempts being made.
The actual impact varies greatly depending on the propagation algorithm. Generally, better
algorithms will have a more severe impact on the network infrastructure. While, for example, the
initial worm of gure 1 sends out a total of about 7600 probes per second once it has reached satura-
tion, that of gure 7 on page 13 with reduced timeouts, multi-threading and local preference, scans
the network with over 160,000 probes per second. This is overshadowed by the prescan-preinfect
worm of gure 12, which sends out over 500,000 probes per second after reaching saturation, not
to mention the advanced multi-threading worm of gure 16 with over 6.5 mio probes per second.
Turning this data into network load requires an estimation of packet sizes for both scanning
and the worm itself. Also, the total load on the entire network is less interesting than the load on
local clusters. As both are outside the scope of this article, only a single example was investigated
in-depth:
7.1 Example trac graph
Assuming a worm of 2048 bytes size, with an average MTU of 1500 bytes, spreading over TCP.
The worm would require an initial 3-way handshake, 2 packets to transfer itself, and shutdown.
The total overhead will be 676 bytes, so each infection causes 2724 bytes of trac. In addition,
each probe will cause 296 bytes of trac if the opposite site does not reply, or 134 bytes of trac
if it replies with an RST.
The "combined" worm shown in gure 5 would then after reaching saturation create a total
(network-wide) trac of about 5.6 GB/min, every minute9.
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Figure 17: Trac usage of an example worm
9The graph shows trac per tick, i.e. 2 minutes.7 ESTIMATING THE IMPACT ON THE NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE 26
7.2 Packet count
Trac should not be measured only in size, but also in number of packets, as many small packets
can aect a network as badly or worse than large amounts of data. Any contact with a remote
system is registered as one "probe" by the simulation software. No eort was made to translate
probe count into actual packet count, as low-level network details would have to be simulated to
do this reliably. Much also depends on implementation details, e.g. how many re-transmits would
a scanning algorithm attempt?
One reasonable assumption would be to set each probe equal to a about 2 packets. For an
infection or infection attempt under the data above, 8 packets would be needed, but the majority
of probes, those to oine system or systems not running the vulnerable service, 2 packets would
be sucient. This includes one retransmit for the scanning, or the RST or ICMP packet in return
to a closed port.
7.3 Eects of propagation algorithms
Taking only the peak values into account, various propagation algorithms show clear dierences in
how much trac they cause, as shown in table 3. All data was normalised to one minute intervals,
so various algorithms can be compared.
Algorithm Peak Trac Peak Probes Peak reached Reference
random propagation 0.3 GB/min 0.5 mio/min ca. 620 min. page 7
random, multi-threading 2.7 GB/min 4.6 mio/min ca. 75 min page 10
combined 5.6 GB/min 9.4 mio/min ca. 45 min page 11
combined w/local pref 6.9 GB/min 10.0 mio/min ca. 40 min page 13
sequential 0.3 GB/min 0.5 mio/min ca. 940 min page 14
pre-scanning 7.7 GB/min 17.4 mio/min ca. 20 min page 17
advanced scanning 28.8 GB/min 59 mio/min ca. 6 min page 22
advanced, multi-threading 1093 GB/min 400 mio/min ca. 80 sec. page 23
Table 3: Trac usage of various worms
It can now be considered proven that massive activity is the key to worm propagation. Stealth
and speed are mutually exclusive. It has also been shown which approaches to the problem oer
the highest increases in propagation speed.8 PAYLOADS 27
8 Payloads
While this paper is not about payloads, the discussion above opens up new options in this area.
It has so far been generally believed that a destructive worm, e.g. one that wipes the hard-disk of
its host, would not live long or spread far because it destroys the very population it thrives on.
This is not entirely true. If the worm can estimate how close it is to saturation, it can very well
wait with its destructive intent until saturation has been reached or is near, because all vulnerable
machines have been infected and there is nowhere else to go anyway.
The payload need not be targeted at the host, however. Several past worms had DDoS attack
payloads. They were keyed to commence their attacks at a certain point in time, giving their
victims ample time to prepare. If a worm were able to dynamically calculate its position in the
growth curve, it could unleash its attack at an a) not immediately obvious and b) optimal point
in time.
It seems obvious to the author that pointing a DDoS network of this size at a single site is
ludicrous overkill. Even in the simulated network, and with a limit of 56 KB/sec per host, the
worm would command almost 9 GB/sec. Scaling the numbers up to Internet size, the DDoS would
be on the order of 2 TB/sec, most of which would never reach the target due to network overload
in the local or backbone routers. Not to mention that many of the DDoS zombies will have much
more bandwidth available then the conservative 56 KB/sec.
8.1 Propagation with destructive payloads
In order to verify the assumption made above, a simulation was run with a destructive payload.
The worm in gure 18 shows a variant of the advanced multi-threading worm from page 23 which
starts destroying hosts 60 seconds after it starts spreading. The chance that it destroys its hosts
instead of spreading further is 5% per tick (5 seconds) afterwards, i.e. at 70 seconds it is 10%, at
80 seconds it is 20%, etc., with a maximum of 50% after second 110.
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Figure 18: Advanced Worm with destructive payload
The propagation speed is not aected very much by the destruction the worm brings to its8 PAYLOADS 28
hosts. An additional curve has been plotted in this graph, showing the number of vulnerable, but
not infected systems. As it clearly shows, there are few survivors. At the end of this simulation
run, there were 2.774 infected and 1.979 not infected systems left, of an initial 166.730. While this
not quite "annihilation", it does mean that within two minutes, 161.977 hosts or about 97% of the
vulnerable population were wiped out.
Most importantly, however, comparing these numbers to those of the advanced worm proves
the point. The advanced worm also did not reach a 100% infection ratio, but left 1.978 survivors.
Scaling this simulation up to Internet size, even very carefully, shows that it is entirely feasible
to destroy on the order of magnitude of 40 mio. hosts in less than 5 minutes. This assumes a weak
exploit against a small minority of systems. If the exploit aects a larger part of the population,
for example the exploit used by Blaster, the damage will be both quicker and much more extensive.
8.2 Local Network Destruction
Another possibility to combine even more speed advantages is available if a specic target can
be attacked from the inside. Individual targets, say the network of a major corporations, usually
have more and softer targets than the Internet at large.
An attack on a corporations in-house network, utilising an exploit against the workstation
systems, could infect and wipe out 98% of the entire client population in one minute. This is
due to the fact that in most internal networks, the clustering structure is much stronger, more
of the address space is used, and most of the systems are part of a monoculture, often featuring
thousands of virtually identical systems.
Several simulations were run with a Class B network size, with other parameters modied
to more closely represent an internal network instead of the Internet. The worm spreads from
a single entry point and starts destroying its hosts after 30 seconds. As and would reach the
aforementioned 98% destruction rate easily within the rst minute. As gure 19 shows, it easily
accomplishes its goal, destroying the aected corporate infrastructure in well below the reaction
time of even the best IT department.
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Figure 19: Local Network Destruction8 PAYLOADS 29
8.3 Self-Preservation of Worms
Even though the worms presented will infect their host population much too fast for any kind of
manual countermeasures, it is noisy enough to catch immediate attention. If its purpose requires
the worm to survive for more than a few hours, it will need some way to prevent or at least delay
countermeasures such as patching.
Research into this area is currently being conducted. Some worms seen in the wild already
disable anti-virus software or take other primitive baby steps into this very direction.9 CONCLUSION 30
9 Conclusion
It has long been argued that future worms will be stronger and faster. This research shows
that Flash Worms are feasible without unrealistic assumptions about their properties, and which
elements make the main dierence in designing such a worm:
 Some way to discard the vast amounts of unused or oine addresses very quickly
 An initial pre-infection step, or a targeted distribution into known-vulnerable networks
 Multi-threading
As the primary means of improving propagation speed, as well as:
 Identication of already infected or non-vulnerable hosts
 Fast infection of victims
As additional options to gain further speed improvements.
From these points it follows that the addition of a stateless scanning algorithm, optionally with
an additional identication step such as a banner scan or OS ngerprint, will be the next major
leap forward in worm development.
It should also be expected that worms will carry a small data segment that contains such
information as to which large networks are unassigned or unused and can be skipped (this was
discussed in section 4.7 on page 19).
9.1 Countermeasures
The main lesson consists in the knowledge that any kind of advanced worm will be too quick
to allow for manual analysis and countermeasures. Even the preparations for a typical analysis
take longer then the advanced worms presented here need to reach saturation10. By the time
countermeasures are taken, the worm had more than ample opportunity to accomplish whatever
it was designed to accomplish.
9.1.1 Preventive Countermeasures
One defence could be constructed by having massive scanning and/or incoming connections, as
well as other typical footprints of worm attacks trigger automated self-defence mechanisms. Some
systems of this kind are already deployed or under development as DoS and DDoS defences.
Contrary to popular opinion and - otherwise valid - arguments about mono-culture, reducing
the number of vulnerable systems only oers a marginal slow down eect. A simulation run with
only a quarter the vulnerable hosts (about 41,000) reached saturation in about 120 seconds. For
the forseable future, it is certainly safe to assume that exploits will be found that 1% or more of
the Internet connected hosts are vulnerable to.
9.1.2 Legal Countermeasures
Improving the law enforcement agencies abilities to track and incarcerate worm authors might
serve as a deterrence and thus reduce the likelihood of an advanced worm being actually deployed.
However, the past record in this area is not very promising, and the issue of jurisdiction is
not going to be resolved quickly. In addition, other crimes and their penalties show that even the
harshest sentence does not deteredeter everyone. For an advanced worm, a single unimpressed
culprit would be enough.
10This point remains true, even if the complications not taken into account, such as bandwidth limitations, slow
the worm down. Unless the slowdown factor is very large, in the magnitude of 10 or more, it will not invalidate the
point that manual intervention is too slow.9 CONCLUSION 31
It is not likely that harsher sentences, stronger surveillance or better educated law enforcement
personal would make a measurable dierence in global security.
9.1.3 Local Protection
For short and medium time security planning, therefore, the main focus should be to protect the
local network from a hostile Internet. Current worms could be ltered easily on border routers,
provided those have enough spare computing power. However, if it becomes necessary, it is likely
that worms will inherit polymorphic capabilities from viruses. These would defeat any simple
lters, and routers are not suited for more advanced virus scanning methods, even if the problem
of false positives could be ignored.
9.1.4 Conclusion
I am thus forced to conclude this paper without a good recommendation for global countermea-
sures, as an in-depth discussion of these is outside its scope.
The results of my research do show some of the parameters for the yet-to-be-developed counter-
measure systems, however, as well as the kind of worms that can be expected to visit the Internet
sometime soon.
In the past, worm research was usually ahead of actual worms found in the wild, and in fact
researchers were regularly underwhelmed by the new worms that appeared on the Internet. A
prognosis of doom is certainly not adequate, and even if a worm of destructive potential were
to appear, viewed from a long-term perspective, its eect on the Internet could be argued as
benecial, due to the reduction of vulnerable hosts. Whether or not principles of evolution hold
true for this articial environment, however, remains to be seen.10 APPENDIX 32
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